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Building Assets from Birth: A Global Comparison 






Asset building is a growing theme in public policy, and building assets from birth in the form of Child Development 
Accounts is now occurring in several countries. This paper provides an overview of the Child Development Account 
policies in Singapore, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Korea, and the proposed policy in the United States. The 
key elements of inclusiveness, progressivity, coherence and integration, and development are explicated and discussed. 
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In today‟s globalized and knowledge-based economy, income by itself is often insufficient to 
provide for the well-being of individuals and families. To succeed in the post-industrial economy, 
people must continually invest in themselves and expand their capabilities. While income is 
important for consumption, it does not by itself enable people to improve their circumstances over 
the long term. Development occurs through asset accumulation and investment (Sherraden, 1991). 
Assets provide individuals with control over resources, financial security, and ability to meet 
unanticipated lumpy costs. Assets also facilitate investments in future aspirations, and enable people 
to seize opportunities that might otherwise be closed to them (New America Foundation, 2005; 
Paxton, 2001, 2002; Sherraden, 1991).  
Public policy in today‟s technologically changing world should be about inclusive wealth creation, 
not simply redistribution (Giddens, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). Asset-based policy is one such policy 
innovation that is occurring in many countries (Emmerson & Wakefield, 2001; Gregory & 
Drakeford, 2006; OECD, 2003; Regan & Paxton, 2001; Sherraden, 2002, 2003b). Proposed by 
Sherraden (1991), asset-based policies are, broadly speaking, all public policies that encourage 
individuals to accumulate, hold, or develop assets (Emmerson & Wakefield, 2001; Loke & 
Sherraden, 2006).  
Including children in asset-based policies, and opening Child Development Accounts (CDAs) 
beginning at birth, may be a promising policy direction. First, asset building is a long-term process 
and starting early can provide a life-time potential for asset accumulation, resulting in greater 
accumulations. Second, asset holding may change outlook and attitudes in positive ways (Shobe & 
Page-Adams, 2001; Yadama & Sherraden, 1996), and it is easier and more effective to change 
outlook and attitudes earlier rather than later in life. Third, asset-based policies targeting children 
may have a multiplier effect by engaging the larger family in the asset-accumulation process. 
Members of the extended family may learn from this process, and parental expectations for children 
may also be positively affected (Zhan, 2006). Fourth, asset-based policies for children may also be 
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the most direct and effective way to alter class reproduction and diminish intergenerational 
transmission of poverty (Sherraden, 2002). 
Several countries have recently implemented or are proposing policies that build assets for every 
child starting from birth. Among the countries that already have some form of national CDA policy 
are Singapore, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Canada. The United States has legislation on 
CDAs moving through Congress at present. The Hong Kong government announced that it has 
earmarked HK$300 million in the 2007 Budget for the establishment of a Child Development Fund 
in order to support NGO-initiated CDA projects (Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 2007).  
Purposes and strategies adopted by each country for CDAs are different. In this paper, we provide 
an overview of the CDA policies in Singapore, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Korea, and the 
proposed policy in the United States. Key elements of these policies are explicated and discussed.  
Overview of Child Development Account Policies 
Singapore 
Asset-based policies are the mainstay of social development in Singapore, where a comprehensive 
cradle-to-grave asset-building policy is highly innovative. Presently Singapore has three asset-
building programs targeting children. Beginning at birth to age 6, children benefit from the Baby 
Bonus scheme; from ages 6 to 16, there is the Edusave account; and between the ages of 7 and 20, 
there is the Post-Secondary Education Account. Unused balances are eventually rolled over to the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF)1 account that follows the account holder into retirement. 
Edusave  
Singapore‟s Edusave Scheme is probably the first universal child asset-building program in the world 
(Curley & Sherraden, 2000). Implemented in 1993, it benefits school-going children in that each 
child can expect to receive S$4,000 in their Edusave accounts over their ten years in school (Goh, 
1990). The funds in these automatically opened interest-earning Edusave accounts are used only for 
enrichment programs for the children and for approved school fees. Unused balances are 
transferred to the child‟s Post-Secondary Education Account (PSEA) when the child reaches the age 
of 16 or when he/she leaves secondary school, whichever is later. The Edusave Scheme is funded by 
the interest earned from an S$5 billion Edusave Endowment Fund established from government 
general funds. 
Baby Bonus  
In 2001, the Singapore government introduced the Baby Bonus Scheme as part of the government‟s 
overall effort to increase fertility rates and create an environment conducive to raising a family. 
                                                 
1
 The Central Provident Fund is a system of individual savings accounts that every employed person contributes to, 
with matched contributions from employers. The savings, while primarily meant for retirement, may also be used for 
certain medical expenses and for a variety of asset-building purposes such as the purchase of homes, investments, 
life insurance, and tertiary educational expenses. More information on the Central Provident Fund is available at 
http://www.cpf.gov.sg. 
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Comprised of two tiers, the first tier consists of an unrestricted cash gift from the government of 
S$3,000 for the first and second child, and S$6,000 for the third and fourth child. This cash gift is 
deposited directly into a savings account. The second tier consists of a Children Development 
Account (SCDA) for the second to fourth child.2 Families can save into these interest-earning 
SCDAs over a period of six years and have their contributions matched one-to-one up to the cap of 
S$6,000 for the second child and a cap of S$12,000 each for the third and fourth child (Singapore 
Ministry of Community Development Youth and Sports, 2006).  
Funds in the SCDAs may be used from birth to age six for expenses related to childcare, preschool, 
special education or early intervention programs, medical expenses, and medical insurance. 
Unutilized account balances are transferred to the child‟s Post-Secondary Education Account 
(PSEA) once the child enters primary school.  
Post-Secondary Education Account 
The Post-Secondary Education Account (PSEA) was created in 2005 to help families build up a 
resource pool so that they could “invest in the best education that their children can get, which is 
the best investment they can make” to prepare their children for the economy of the future (Lee, 
2005). To kick-start the scheme in 2008, the government has allocated S$400 million to start the 
accounts of 650,000 eligible children (Shanmugaratnam, 2007). Depending on the financial situation 
of each household, children between ages 13 and 20 will receive S$200 or S$400 in 2008, and the 
same amount again in 2009. Children between ages 7 and 12, who have more opportunities for 
government top-ups in the future, will receive S$100 or S$200 each year over the same period.  
Families may contribute into the PSEA when the account holder is between the ages of 7 and 18. 
These contributions attract a one-to-one government match for the savings, capped at a combined 
government contribution to the PSEA and SCDA of S$6,000 for the second child, and S$12,000 for 
the third or fourth child (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2005). Funds in the PSEA can be used 
for post-secondary education expenses, and unutilized balances are transferred to the account 
holder‟s Central Provident Fund (CPF) account by age 30 (Shanmugaratnam, 2007). 
Canada 
The Canada Education Savings Program (CESP) administers two federal programs, the Canada 
Education Savings Grant (CESG) and the Canada Learning Bond (CLB). Both programs use the 
Registered Education Savings Plan (RESP), a tax-deferred savings vehicle, as the vehicle to achieve 
and encourage savings for a child‟s post-secondary education. Monies accumulated in the RESPs 
from private contributions, CESG, and CLB can be withdrawn without penalty for qualified post-
secondary educational expenses, or transferred to another child without CLB monies. However, if 
the savings in the RESPs are not used for post-secondary educational purposes, all monies received 
through CESG and CLB must be returned to the Canadian Government (Human Resources and 
Skills Development Canada, 2006). 
                                                 
2
 The Baby Bonus Scheme is a pro-natal policy aimed at encouraging families to have more children – in particular, 
their second and third children. The policy has been criticized for the differential treatment of each child based on 
birth order. For example, see Sherraden’s (2001) comments on the scheme when it was initiated. 
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Canada Education Savings Grant 
Introduced in 1998, the CESG pays a 20% match on the first C$2,000 or less contributed to a 
child‟s RESP each year. To help lower-income families increase their savings, families with annual 
net incomes of C$37,1783 or less in 2007 receive an additional 20% grant on the first C$500 
contributed to a RESP, while families with net annual incomes between C$37,178 and C$74,357 
receive an additional 10% grant on the first C$500 contributed. The total CESG amounts paid 
(additional and basic grants) are subject to a C$7,200 lifetime limit, and an annual limit of C$500 
(Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2007a).  
Canada Learning Bond 
The Canada Learning Bond (CLB) is a government entitlement to help modest-income families save 
for their child‟s post-secondary education. Announced in 2004 and implemented in July 2005, the 
CLB provides an initial entitlement of C$500 to a child‟s RESP if he or she is born after 31 
December 2003, and the family is eligible for the National Child Benefit Supplement. In addition, as 
long as the family continues to receive the National Child Benefit Supplement,4 the child will get an 
extra annual payment of C$100 for up to 15 years. The lifetime limit of the Canada Learning Bond 
per child is C$2,000. An additional C$25 is paid with the first C$500 bond to help families cover the 
cost of opening a RESP. If the eligible family or child does not open a RESP by the time the child 
turns 21, the CLB entitlements will be forfeited (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 
2007c). 
United Kingdom  
The Child Trust Fund (CTF) was implemented in April 2005 as a new long-term savings and 
investment account for children born on or after 1 September 2002. The policy objectives of the 
CTF are to help people understand the benefits of saving and investing, encourage parents and 
children to develop a saving habit and engage with financial institutions, ensure that in the future all 
children have a financial asset at the start of adult life, and build on financial education to help 
people make better financial choices throughout their lives.  
In the CTF, the government makes an initial contribution of £250 in the form of a CTF voucher at 
birth and an additional top-up of £250 on the child‟s seventh birthday. The CTF voucher can only 
be invested in one of three CTF account types – a stakeholder account, a non-stakeholder shares 
account, or a non-stakeholder savings account. A supplemental £250 is paid into the CTF accounts 
of children from lower-income families at birth and at age seven. Parents, family, and friends can 
contribute up to a total of £1,200 per year to a CTF account with the earnings exempt from tax, 
while children in care will receive £100 per year from the government (HM Treasury, 2007). 
Funds in the CTF account can be withdrawn by the child only after reaching the age of 18, unless 
the child is terminally ill. There is no restriction on use of the money in a CTF account after 
withdrawal. Funds in the CTF could also be rolled over into an Individual Savings Account on 
maturity (HM Treasury, 2007). 
                                                 
3
 This amount is updated each year based on the rate of inflation. 
4
 The National Child Benefit Supplement is generally for families with a net annual income of C$37,178 and below 
in 2007. The income requirement is updated based on the rate of inflation each year. 
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The South Korean government began establishing Child Development Accounts (KCDA) for 
children in 2007, which can be accessed at age 18 for education, housing, or micro-enterprise start-
up. It is envisioned that the KCDAs will help narrow the gap between the rich and poor and boost 
national economic growth (Han, Kim, & Zou, 2006).  
To be rolled out in phases, 41,500 institutionalized children were targeted for KCDAs in 2007, the 
first year of implementation. In 2008, the target group of children will expand to include all children 
born into low-income families. Children of all the working poor will be included in the program in 
2009. And by 2010, the government intends for the program to cover all children born into low- and 
middle-income households, encompassing approximately 50% of all Korean newborns. 
As an incentive to save, the proposal provides a one-to-one savings match of up to 30,000 won by 
the government for deposits made into the KCDAs each month. In addition, to help 
institutionalized children and orphans begin accumulating assets, the policy calls for a 60,000 won 
monthly deposit into the KCDAs of these children, with 30,000 won funded by organizational 
sponsors and another 30,000 won in match dollars by the government. Starting in 2010, the Korean 
government plans to provide matched deposits twice, 200,000 won at birth and another 200,000 
won at age seven (Nam et al., 2007).  
United States 
Several asset-based policies targeting children have been introduced in the US Congress in recent 
years.5 The America Saving for Personal Investment, Retirement, and Education Act (ASPIRE Act) 
aims to encourage savings, promote financial literacy, and expand opportunities for young adults by 
establishing a Kids Investment and Development (KIDS) account for every child born after 31 
December 2007. This bill would establish the KIDS Account Fund within the Department of the 
Treasury and endow every child with a one-time US$500 contribution into the KIDS account, 
opened automatically with the issuance of the Social Security card. Children in households earning 
below the national median income would be eligible for a supplemental contribution of up to 
US$500, as well as additional matching funds for private contributions saved in the account. The 
annual one-to-one matches would be capped at the first US$500 contributed and phased out for 
households with incomes between 100% and 120% of the national median adjusted gross income 
(AGI). 
Private, voluntary after-tax contributions, capped at US$2,000 annually, could be made to each 
account until the accountholder reaches age 18. Contributions after age 18 would be allowed 
according to Roth IRA rules. A range of investment options, similar to those offered by the Thrift 
Savings Plan – including a government bond fund, a fixed income fund, and a common stock fund 
– would be made available to the accountholders and their custodians. No withdrawals could be 
made from a KIDS account until the accountholder reaches the age 18. Between the ages of 18 and 
25, only withdrawals for post-secondary education are allowed. Thereafter, withdrawals for 
homeownership and retirement security will be permitted. However, a minimum balance equal to 
                                                 
5
 A list of congressional CSA proposals is found at a website of the New America Foundation: 
http://www.assetbuilding.org/resources/childrens_savings_accounts 
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the amount of the automatic initial contribution, initially US$500, would have to be maintained until 
retirement age.  
Key elements of CDA policies 
As evident from the above overview, while the Child Development Account policies adopted by the 
different countries share certain commonalities, they diverge in several key aspects. Sherraden 
(2003a) suggests that asset-based policy should be shaped by the four core principles of 
inclusiveness, progressivity, coherence and integration, and development. This framework will guide 
the discussion of the various CDA policies (see Appendix). 
Inclusiveness 
The most important policy consideration is that of inclusiveness. At its most basic, inclusiveness 
provides universal access to the policy. A higher degree of inclusiveness seeks to ensure the 
participation of all eligible citizens, especially those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. The 
highest degree of inclusiveness provides equal benefit to all participants.  
Although the various CDA policies are generally inclusive, they differ in the extent to which they are 
inclusive. All are potentially universally available, with the exception of the CDA in Korea. The 
KCDA, as currently implemented, targets low- and middle-income households, and thus does not 
yet satisfy the core principle of inclusiveness with respect to providing universal access to the policy. 
The KCDA‟s emphasis on children at the bottom, however, is preferable to an emphasis on children 
at the top.  
Even when the policies are universally accessible, none of the countries have attained 100% 
inclusion in their policies in terms of participation rates or in terms of equal distribution of benefits. 
In the United Kingdom where accounts are either opened by parents or by the government in 
default, it is estimated that 2% of eligible children do not have Child Benefits claimed for them and 
thus do not receive the CTF vouchers. Consequently these children are excluded from the CTF 
(Financial Times Adviser, 2006). In Singapore, about 40% of children born since 2002 are excluded 
from the SCDA due to its underlying pro-natal and family planning focus (Singapore Department of 
Statistics, 2006). In Canada where subscribers need to sign up for the programs, the participation 
rate for the CESG stood at 35% as of 31 March 2007, while less than 8% of eligible Canadian 
children receive the CLB (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2007b).  
The experiences in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Singapore have also shown that lower-income 
families have lower awareness of the programs, are building up their children‟s assets at a much 
slower pace, and hence benefit from the policies at lower levels than their wealthier counterparts 
(Human Resources Development Canada, 2003; Sodha, 2006). For example, only 15% of accounts 
from lower-income families had additional contributions in the CTF accounts, compared to 28% 
among the higher-income families (HM Revenue and Customs, 2007b). Special efforts are required 
to ensure that lower-income families participate and benefit from policies at the same level as 
higher-income families. There is neither a practical nor an ethical rationale for giving more public 
support to those who are better off.  
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One way to help lower-income families benefit at the same level as higher-income families would be 
to introduce progressive elements into these policies. At minimum, Sherraden (2003b) argues, 
everyone should receive equal monetary benefits regardless of income. A progressive ideal would be 
for lower-income families to receive greater benefits from the policies than those with more wealth.  
With the exception of the Baby Bonus scheme in Singapore, which is pro-natal in purpose, the 
various policies described in this paper in key respects subscribe to the higher ideal of progressivity 
with progressive elements built into them. The KCDA targets children from the lower half of the 
economy, while lower-income families receive supplemental contributions in the CTF, CLB, and in 
the ASPIRE Act. Lower-income families also receive additional or higher match rates in the 
ASPIRE Act and the CESG. In addition, children in care receive supplemental contributions in the 
CTF and in the KCDA.  
While the various policies all include certain progressive elements, it remains to be seen if the 
differential and preferential treatment of the modest- and lower-income families will bring about a 
narrowing of the gap between children from lower and higher-income families. For example, while 
CESG provides higher match rates for low- to modest-income families, all families are subject to the 
same lifetime cap, regardless of income level. In addition, there is the question of the adequacy of 
the progressivity. Using the CTF as a case in point, if families are not able to make any additional 
contributions into the accounts beyond the initial endowment and subsequent top-up, would the 
estimated £1,6506 in the CTF be adequate and meaningful in enlarging opportunities and capabilities 
when the accounts mature at age 18? In comparison, those who are able to make regular 
contributions of £100 per month to their CTF would have about £29,030 available when the 
accounts mature.  
Coherence and Integration 
Coherence and integration can be viewed from two perspectives – at the policy level and at the 
institutional level. At the policy level, asset-based policies would integrate the various asset-building 
structures into a single, simple, multi-purpose yet coherent system that follows the child through the 
life-course (Sherraden, 2003a). On the institutional level, asset-based policies would build on and 
extend existing institutional infrastructure to beneficiaries of the policy. For example, asset-based 
policies would leverage and extend existing financial arrangements to engage low-income 
households, which are less likely to have bank accounts (Boshara, 2003; Carney & Gale, 2001; 
Hogarth & Lee, 2000), in the financial mainstream.  
The various asset-based policies in Singapore are the best example of a coherent and integrated 
system. While there are three different asset accounts for children at the policy level, these accounts 
are integrated in the sense that unused funds are seamlessly rolled over from one account to the 
next, with use of the accounts calibrated for the developmental and life-cycle needs at each life 
stage. Eventually, unused funds in the child asset accounts will be rolled over to the Central 
Provident Fund. In addition, the Edusave accounts and the PSEA ride on and extend the existing 
                                                 
6
 This assumes a government contribution of £500 at birth and at age seven, with no additional contribution to the 
account, growing at 5% per annum in a stakeholder account. Figures calculated by the Child Trust Fund Calculator 
found at http://www.childtrustfund.gov.uk/templates/Calculator____1250.aspx.  
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Central Provident Fund infrastructure. The Baby Bonus Scheme also extends financial institutional 
arrangements in that it engages beneficiaries in the financial market by utilizing commercial bank 
accounts as the platform to manage and disburse the benefits of the scheme. In this manner, every 
beneficiary – both trustee (usually the parent) and the child – would have a bank account opened. 
Financial arrangements and relationships that may not have been available to low wealth individuals 
previously are extended to them through the scheme. 
On the institutional level, the CTF, KCDA, and the Canadian schemes measure well as they engage 
account holders with existing financial institutions, with accounts held and managed by the private 
market. In addition, the Canadian schemes ride on the existing RESP infrastructure. However, the 
sheer amount of investment choices available may prove daunting for some, leading to lower 
engagement rates as seen in the UK (Kempson & Atkinson, 2006). 
At the policy level, coherence and integration could be improved. While the CTF now allows for 
funds to be rolled over to an Individual Savings Account on maturity (HM Treasury, 2007), it is not 
integrated with any other policies as the CTF outstrips the progress of any other contemporary 
asset-based schemes in the UK (Gregory & Drakeford, 2006). In Canada, the CESG and CLB 
require separate application processes. In addition, the RESP accounts are held in the name of the 
subscribers (usually parents) with the child named as beneficiaries, and are limited to post-secondary 
education purposes. As such, the accounts cannot „follow‟ the child through the life-cycle, resulting 
in a lack of continuity in asset accumulation for the child. 
The KIDS accounts in the United States do not measure as well against the principle of coherence 
and integration at the policy or the institutional level. As currently proposed, KIDS accounts require 
the establishment of a new structure within the Treasury Department to administer the accounts, 
rather than leveraging an existing policy structure. In addition, the policy does not engage the 
beneficiaries with existing financial institutions, nor does it extend other private sector financial 
arrangements to them.  
Development 
Asset-based policies are primarily about development, about enhancing opportunities and 
capabilities of people, empowering individuals and families to be in control of their lives, and 
enabling greater contribution to society and the economy. Asset-based policies are not about 
amelioration of specific problems or even about fighting poverty (Sherraden, 2003a). Against this 
yardstick, the various asset-based policies discussed in this paper all measure well.  
The CTF, CESP, KCDA, and the KIDS Accounts all have as their stated purpose the objective of 
making a pool of resources available for account holders as they enter adult life at age 18. In the case 
of the CESP, it is for the purpose of enlarging the opportunities for accessing post-secondary 
education. For KIDS accounts and KCDA, monies in the accounts could be used for a range of 
asset-building purposes, such as post-secondary education, home purchase, and saving for 
retirement. A focus on development in the CTF is also reflected through emphasis on financial 
education, through self-management of the accounts, and through the eventual control over how 
the monies in the account will be utilized after maturity. Unlike the other policies discussed, the 
CTF has no restriction on use after withdrawal (Gregory & Drakeford, 2006).  
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The various asset-based policies targeting children in Singapore perhaps measure the best on the 
criterion of development. What sets the Singapore policies apart is the emphasis on facilitating 
development of both financial and non-financial assets throughout childhood, rather than 
accumulating assets for a better start in adulthood. By allowing withdrawals during each stage of 
childhood, accountholders have greater access to both human and non-human capital development 
opportunities that build non-financial assets early in life, as well as for purchase of medical services 
and insurance. This in turn may increase the ability to access higher education and accumulate 
greater wealth and income in the adult years. The phased nature of the accounts also ensures that 
there are adequate funds for each stage of childhood, and that all savings are not depleted within a 
single stage. In addition, the Edusave Scheme provides an annual government grant into Edusave 
accounts without the need for any co-savings on the part of accountholders. In 2005, over 399,340 
Edusave account holders withdrew around S$71.5 million from their Edusave accounts for 
developmental purposes (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2006). In addition, 69% of SCDAs had 
seen withdrawals for developmental purposes by January 2007. 
Conclusion 
The Child Development Account policies in Canada, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Korea, 
while still in early stages, already have an impact on long-term savings and on the future pool of 
resources available for children. As of June 2007, over three million children have received benefits 
amounting to some C$3.5 billion under CESG. In comparison, there were only 700,000 accounts 
opened prior to the launch of the Canada Education Savings Grant, according to Marc Lebrun, 
Acting Director General of the Canada Education Savings Program (personal communication, 
February 14, 2006).  
In Korea, over 30,000 or 94% of eligible institutionalized children had opened Child Development 
Accounts by June 2007, just two months after the implementation of the policy. In addition, some 
3,892,000,000 won was accumulated in the Child Development Accounts during these two months 
from the donations of sponsors and from government matches. Institutionalized children who have 
challenging futures can now look forward to having a potential resource pool of 21,600,000 won as 
they enter adult life (Korean Government Information Agency, 2007).  
As of January 2007, the government of Singapore had disbursed S$420 million to parents of 133,000 
newborns since the launch of the Baby Bonus Scheme in April 2001. Over the same period, 89,000 
Children Development Accounts were co-funded with government matches amounting to S$270 
million (Loke & Sherraden, 2007). This translates to an average government match of over S$3000 
per account, with each child having over S$6,000 on average available for developmental purposes 
during their first six years of life. A further S$125 million was disbursed to the Edusave accounts of 
some 440,000 school children in 2005, with each child‟s resource pool for developmental purposes 
increasing by least S$270 in that year. 
In the United Kingdom, over three million CTF vouchers had been issued by September 2007, with 
75% of CTF accounts opened by parents before the end of the 12-month expiry of the vouchers 
(HM Revenue and Customs, 2007c). As of April 2007, assets worth over £1,324 million were held in 
the 2.6 million CTF accounts that had been opened. In addition, 24% of these accounts received 
additional contributions on top of the CTF initial contribution (HM Revenue and Customs, 2007a). 
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With regard to long-term savings for children, David White, CEO of The Children‟s Mutual, one of 
the major CTF providers, states that families are saving 333% more now with CTF than they had 
previously (personal communication, February 7, 2006). In addition, 38% of CTF accounts at 
Children‟s Mutual are being topped up with an average of £24 a month, whereas only 18% of 
children had regular savings and at only £15 a month on average, prior to the introduction of the 
CTF. More significantly, 23% of CTF accounts belonging to the very low-income families are 
having monthly contributions made (personal communication, September 4, 2007).  
While most of the asset-based policies targeting children measure well against the principles of 
inclusiveness, progressivity, coherence and integration, and development, more can be done to 
increase the levels of participation and savings in the various schemes. Lower levels of participation 
and savings are associated with lower income levels. Awareness is also associated with income levels. 
To help lower-income families benefit more from Child Development Accounts, policies should go 
beyond being universally available and progressive. Automatic enrollments and deposits are highly 
desirable. Additionally, communication and publicity materials should be tailored to reach out to 
lower income groups. 
Child Development Accounts appear to be emerging as a new social policy instrument. Discussions 
are underway in other countries as well. The potential of CDAs may be promising, but long-term 
performance and outcomes are not yet known. Inclusive and progressive design principles are 
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Appendix 1. Comparison of Child Development Accounts 
 
 
 Baby Bonus Scheme, 
Edusave Scheme & Post-
Secondary Education 
Account (Singapore) 









Proposed KIDS Accounts  
(United States) 
 
Purposes Increase fertility rates 
(pronatal policy) 
Support families in raising 
children 
Maximize the human 
capital development 
opportunities for children 
at each stage of childhood 
Help people understand 
the benefits of saving and 
investing 
Encourage parents and 
children to develop a 
saving habit and engage 
with financial institutions 
Ensure that in future all 
children have a financial 
asset at the start of adult 
life 
Build on financial 
education to help people 
make better financial 
choices throughout their 
lives 
Encourage savings for 
post-secondary education 
for the Canada Education 
Savings Grant (CESG) 
Kick-start savings for 
post-secondary education 
among low- to modest-
income families for the 
Canada Learning Bond 
(CLB) 
Address the growing 
division between the rich 
and the poor 
Boost national economic 
growth 
Encourage savings 
Promote financial literacy 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 Singapore United Kingdom Canada Korea United States 
Target Age Birth to age 6 (Baby Bonus 
Scheme) 
Age 6 to16 (Edusave 
Scheme) 
Age 7 to 20 (PSEA) 
 
Birth to age 18  Birth to age 17 (CESG) 
Birth to age 21 (CLB) 
Birth to age 18 
 




Baby Bonus Scheme - 
Application at the same time 
as registration of birth of 







born on or after Aug 1, 2001 




automatically sent to 
eligible children born on 
or after 1 September 2002, 
once Child Benefits are 
awarded. Custodians open 
accounts with private 
providers, or accept 
default in which accounts 
are automatically opened 
upon expiry of CTF 
vouchers after 12 months. 
Families open Registered 
Education Savings Plans 
(RESP) and apply 
separately for the CESG 
and CLB 
Eligible children required 
to apply for the opening 
of the accounts  
KIDS accounts 
automatically opened for 
every child issued with a 
Social Security number 
born after December 31, 
2007 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 Singapore United Kingdom Canada Korea United States 
Benefits Baby Bonus Scheme 





 child, and 






Matched co-savings of 
S$6,000 for the 2
nd
 child, 








contributions of at least 
$170 in each Edusave 
account 
PSEA  
Initial contribution of 
between $200 and $800 to 
start the accounts (only in 
2008 and 2009) 
Top-ups of unspecified 
amounts where government 
budgets allow in the future 
Unutilized match-cap from 
CDA carried over 





contributions of up to 
£1,200 per year 
Top-ups of £250 (or £500 
for children from low-
income families) when the 
child reaches the ages of 
7. Additional top-up 




Savings match of 20% on 
the first C$2,000 
contributed to the RESP 
subject to a annual cap of 
C$500 and a lifetime cap 
of C$7,200 
CLB 
Initial contribution of 
C$500 and an annual 
payment of C$100 for up 
to 15 years and a lifetime 
limit of C$2000 for 
eligible modest-income 
families 
C$25 to cover the cost of 
opening a RESP account 
Matched savings of up to 
30,000 won (US$30) per 
month  
Starting in 2010, 
matched deposits of 
200,000 won (US$200) 





Up to US$500 
supplementary 
contribution for children 
from low-income families 
Matched savings of up to 
US$500 per year for 
eligible children from 
low-income families up to 
age 18 
Private contributions up to 
US$2,000 per year 
Earnings tax-exempt 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 Singapore United Kingdom Canada Korea United States 
Progressive 
Elements 
Baby Bonus Scheme  
No progressive elements 
Edusave Scheme 
Edusave merit bursaries for 
low- and modest income 
families 
PSEA 
Lower wealth households 
receive higher quantum of 
initial contribution and 
future top-ups in their 
accounts 
Supplementary 
contributions for children 
from low-income families 
Children in care receives 
additional £100 per year in 
their CTF 
Additional grants of up to 
20% for the first C$500 
contributed to the RESP 
under the CESG  
Eligible for the CLB 
Children from lower-
income families targeted 
for the scheme 
Institutionalized children 
receive up to 30,000 won 
per month from sponsors, 
and an equivalent amount 
in government match 
Supplementary 
contributions and matched 
savings for children from 
lower-income families 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 Singapore United Kingdom Canada Korea United States 
Withdrawals 
and Use of 
Funds 
Baby Bonus Scheme 
Funds can be withdrawn 
before age 6 for childcare, 
preschool, special education, 
early intervention, and 
medical expenses and 
insurance incurred by the 
account holder or a sibling 
Unused balances rolled over 
to the PSEA 
Edusave Scheme 
Funds can be withdrawn for 
approved enrichment 
programs and fees 
Unused balances rolled over 
to the PSEA 
PSEA 
Funds can be withdrawn for 
post-secondary education in 
approved institutions 
Unused balances rolled over 
to the CPF 
Withdrawal permitted only 
when accountholder turns 
18  
No restriction on use of 
funds 
Option of rolling-over 
monies to an Individual 
Savings Account available 
 
Funds can be withdrawn 
for qualified post-
secondary educational 
expenses or transferred 
to another child for the 
same purpose 
Withdrawal permitted 
only when accountholder 




only after accountholder 
turns 18. Funds restricted 
for use according to Roth 
IRA compliance and 
distribution rules. Use of 
funds for first-time home 
purchase and post-
secondary education 
permitted without penalty 
 
